This article examines the emergence since 2011 of the 'Diaosi' (loser) identity among Chinese second generation migrant workers. This subjective identification of a new social category with little hope can be contrasted with the hopeful policy constructions of a strong China eager to promote the civilizing 'suzhi' (population quality) of its population nationally and internationally. Yet, as this article shows, in four steps, these phenomena are intertwined. First, it locates the emergence of this 'Diaosi' subject in the global and national dialectics of hope in China since the global financial crisis. In brief, while transnational policy and business actors constructed emerging markets, especially China, as objects of hope and sources of demand, the Chinese party-state had been hoping, since the 1990s, to build national strength and improve the sushi (quality) of its population. It was in this conjuncture that the Diaosi subject emerged. Second, drawing on neo-Foucauldian and neo-Gramscian scholarship, Diaosi marginality is related to the interaction among global capitalist production, the socialist market economy, continuous state domination via a household registration system (hukou), and the civilizing discourse of 'suzhi'.
Introduction
This article examines the emergence of Chinese second-generation migrant workers who have been narrating and presenting themselves as 'Diaosi' (losers) since 2011.
This self-identification of a new subject category with little hope can be juxtaposed to the concurrent policy constructions of China as an object of hope and strength eager to promote the civilizing 'suzhi' (population quality) of its people on (inter-)national levels. Yet these two phenomena are intertwined. This article has four sections. First, it locates the emergence of this 'Diaosi' subject in the dialectics of China as hope object since the global financial crisis. With the fear of recession in the US and Europe, emerging markets, especially China, have been constructed as objects of hope and sources of demand by transnational policy and business actors. This was articulated to China's own hope, evident since the 1990s, of building national strength, improving the 'suzhi' of its population, etc. This dialectics of hope was a central feature of the conjuncture in which the Diaosi subject emerged.
Second, drawing on neo-Foucauldian and neo-Gramscian scholarship, Diaosi marginality is analysed in terms of a co-governance by global capitalist production, the socialist market economy, continuous state domination via a household registration system (hukou), and the civilizing discourse of 'suzhi' (Pun 2005; Anagnost 2004; Yan 2008) . Focusing on suzhi-hukou discourses and practices, the article examines them as a biopolitical population management mechanism in which less value is attached to migrant workers' lives and their labour-power receives lower wages. This sushi-hukou way of reproducing and managing inequalities means that migrants live in marginal conditions. Their marginality and subalternity are popularized through terms such as 'Dwelling Narrowness', 'ant tribe', and 'rat tribe' and, most recently, the Diaosi subject. Third, the article focuses more on the Diaosi's subjective embodiment of marginality in their everyday affective and expressive demeanour. Their experiences of exclusion, devaluation, unfulfilled consumer and romantic desires are central to the Diaosi-loser system of signification. This is far from consistent but involves what Gramsci terms 'contradictory consciousness', which comprises resistance and resignation. Fourth, it considers current efforts by state/corporate capital and the party-state to re-make and re-hegemonize Diaosi life in the name of consumption, civility, and social stability. The article ends with some neo-Gramscian remarks on the complexities and contradictory consciousness of marginal social categories, such as the Diaosi, and their openness to passive revolution and (re-)hegemonization.
Financial Crisis and the Dialectics of China Hope
The 2007 financial crisis in North America and Western Europe prompted fears of recession, rising debts and growing austerity. In response, transnational capitals sought new sites of demand and investment outside these regions. Emerging economies such as China were discursively constructed as dream sites that could contribute towards a global recovery (Sum 2013a ). More specifically, until its own economic slowdown began in 2013, some (inter-)national policy-makers, think tanks, consultancy firms, bankers and economic journalists (e.g., Jaeger 2008; The Economist 2008; O'Neill 2013) represented the 'BRIC' economies, especially 'China', as global hegemonic 'hope' objects that could 'drive' global growth. Narratives such as 'China as the big BRIC', 'China as the second largest economy in the world', 'China has an 8% GDP growth rate', 'China has a large middle-class consumer market', etc., were circulated transnationally (for dissenting views, see Chanos 2011; Block 2011; Pettis 2011 ).
This hegemonic hope for global recovery is articulated to the Chinese Communist Party's hope for national glory through modernity (Yang and Lim 2010; Wang 2014) , consumer citizenship (Hooper 2005; Ren 2013) , and a neo-Confucian 'civility' (Bell 2010) conducive to 'social harmony' (later in terms of the 'China Dream'). Discourses on 'harmony' and 'suzhi' are prevalent in policy and everyday life since the 1990s (Anagnost 2004; Yan 2008; Jacka 2009 ). This approach to the art of governing has many manifestations but one particular expression is the discourse of middle-class 'suzhi' (Tomba 2009 ). This new class, comprising urban professionals and entrepreneurs, is constructed as 'suzhi' bearers. Their embodiment of population quality includes education, lifestyle, civil dispositions and the ability to capacitate themselves to appreciate the 'finer things in life' (Zhang 2010: 19; Ren 2011: 118-21; 2013: 34-44) . This embodiment of 'suzhi' is especially pronounced in the middleclass consumer subjects whose actions are seen as stimulating the market without challenging the social order (Tomba 2009 ).
This co-identification of global China and its domestic middle class as hope objects was materially grounded in the rolling out of neoliberal measures/techniques in China under socialist state rule/guidance (Pow 2012: 38-39) . Focusing on middleclass housing as symbolic of these changes, this middle-class hope for 'suzhi' life is intertwined with the desire for housing and homeownership in urban metropoles (Zhang 2010: 52-78) . From a political economy perspective, this remaking of neoliberal personhood has depended on the marketization of land and housing markets from the 1990s onwards. This allowed for the institutionalization of land-use right market as well as the purchase of commercialized housing (Wu, Xu and Yeh 2006: 50) . It allows local governments (and their investment arms), land/property developers and state-owned banks to: (a) derive income from selling land-use rights, obtaining land-based loans, collateralizing land/property, and building/selling/speculating commodity housing for profit; and (b) pursue GDP growth rates (as GDPism) (Sum 2013b ) that help cadres and those with connections rise up the bureaucratic ranks (Sum 2013a (Leung 2015; Hsing 2009; Zhang 2010) began to rise. Apart from activism, marginality was expressed through terms such as 'Dwelling Narrowness' (Yu 2011; Hung 2011) , 'ant tribe' (Zhang 2013) , and 'rat tribe'
and, more recently, the Diaosi subject. The latter (self-)narrates as 'loser' subjects with 'little hope' (see below). Their 'lack of hope' is dialectically intertwined with the global hegemonic construction of China as a 'hope' object and its own modernity hope of national strength and a quality population. First, the purpose of the hukou system, established in the 1950s, has changed from preventing peasants from leaving their land to allowing them to 'float' into urban areas since the Deng era. Being a peasant in China is not an occupation but a status tied to one's birth (Zhang, N., 2014) . Under the hukou system, rural migrants can move to cities, work and reside there but are not entitled to urban resources such as schooling and hospitals. This discourse of hukou targets the migrant population once they move to the cities. It operates as a governmental technology of classification and categorizes them as 'nongmin gong' (peasant workers). The policy space then excludes them from full entitlement to subsidized housing, education, medical care and welfare. This functional discrimination is deployed to deny migrants urban citizenship. Although the hukou system has undergone several reforms, it is still hard to convert from rural to urban status and, where it occurs, the privileges of the urban elite and China's costs of production are challenged in fundamental ways.
Exclusionary Practices in
Since the 1990s, the exclusionary nature of hukou practices has been exacerbated by the modernity discourse of 'suzhi', which posits a hierarchy of civility. This not only denies the rural population access to urban resources but also devalues it as having 'lower quality'. Thus migrants are judged/labelled as transient and secondary.
This technology of judgement assigns them a lower status more suitable for undesirable employment (.e.g., factory work, construction industry, low service sector, etc.) at lower wages (Zhang, F., 2014) . These practices can be seen as part of a state-based biopolitical population management mechanism that marked migrants out as rural-inferior bodies to be assigned lower value in the urban environment. Once they migrate from the countryside, such exclusionary practices downgrade the value of their life as well as the market value of their labour-power.
They become the source of cheap and flexible labour serving national development and China's insertion into global capitalism. These hukou-suzhi ways of constructing and governing inequalities mean that migrants must resort to living in marginal and sub-citizen conditions. Their sub-citizenship plights, together with the rising housing prices and rents, mean that industrial and service migrants must rely on employer- Pulitzer Centre 2015) . This facet of subaltern life is dubbed as 'rat tribe' and has been captured photographically by Sim (2015) .
Diaosi Embodiment of Marginality and Contradictory Consciousness
These uneven macrosocial and biopolitical developments also affect their urban into 'diao' which is a slang word for 'dick' (penis). Through this transposition from 'di'
to 'diao', Li Yi's fans were no longer 'fans of emperor' but 'fans of penis' (diao-si).
This metonymic transposition via the body set the stage for the second moment of this collective wordplay. Li Yi's fans, instead of being offended, appropriated this as a self-mocking label within their proud fandom. They took pride in this derogatory label that resonated with subaltern migrants caught up in the dialectics of hope and frustration in China's development. This label soon went viral, escaping its original social base. Within two months after its coining in 2011, it generated 41.1 million search results and 2.2 million blog posts on Google and China's Twitter-like Weibo respectively (Lui 2015) . Young subalterns started to proclaim themselves as 'Diaosi'
and there are all kinds of chat rooms and social media set up for this purpose (e.g.,
YY and QQ chats).
A third moment began as the label gained popularity and Diaosi expressed their new system of signification in the public arena. They use their body to express exclusion, devaluation, frustration, hardship, social pain as well as unfulfilled consumer and romantic desires. They self-represent Diaosi marginality in corporeal terms and sceptically and ironically mapped themselves as 'poor, short and ugly' losers (Marquis and Yang 2013: 3 (Gao 2013) . The popularity of this identity is partly reinforced by the mutual imbrication of the activities of the social media and their users. By February 2013, it was even widely circulated on these media (e.g., .com, sina.com, qq.com, tianya.cn; nbweekly.com, etc.) what constitute male and female Diaosi 'standards' (see table 1 ). and privileged with 'three treasures' (iPhone, sports car and designer watch) (Marquis and Yang 2013: 9) and also attract beautiful girls (see later). This juxtaposition of opposing body types constructs a Diaosi-Gaofushuai binary based on economic and social inequalities. Drawing on Scott's concept of 'hidden transcripts ' (1990) , this performative and narrative modern folklore about unevenness contains a mix of latent critique, self-mockery, self-protection, and selfentertainment (Yang, Tang and Wang 2015) . It is a mundane way of protesting and relieving pressure in a system where exclusion is highly institutionalized and freedom of speech involves guerrilla tactics. The gaps between these two groups are further highlighted online via satirical cartoons, everyday photographs, TV shows, fantasy talks, etc. These include comparing their diverse modes of transport (bus vs. BMW), brands of smartphones (Nokia vs. Apple iPhone); eating places (side-street stores vs. expensive restaurants), and romantic encounters.
Weibo
Apart from framing inequalities via body and consumption types, Diaosi also construct themselves as 'romantically unlucky' as their ideal girlfriends (named 'goddesses') are 'Bafumei' (fair-skinned, rich and pretty) and not 'Heimu'er' ('Black Fungus' women who are overly sexual experienced) (Li, Spotti and Kroon 2014) .
Given their meagre income, unattractive physique and the existence of a matchmaking industry catering mainly for rich men (Larmer 2013) , Diasoi imagine that they will be out-competed by Gaofushuai/princelings and the Bafumei girls only belong to these rich and powerful men. This trope was vividly captured in a set of popular remarks first posted on ifeng.com: These ironic remarks reveal the subaltern-Diaosi common sense that contains a mix of precarious life with little money and no background; the self-mockery of a fate with no future/hope; the emotional emptiness of being shunned/mocked by 'goddesses', the latent hostility towards social elitism embodied by Gaofushuai and princelings; and the despair of not being accepted; but these tropes are concurrently subordinated to the hegemonic norms of sexual stereotypes and the unfulfilled dream of consumerism and entrepreneurialism for socio-economic advancement.
Such ironic identities (Szablewicz 2014: 268) and contradictory consciousness (à laGramsci) involves self-deprecating critiques towards social inequalities but also submitting to the seduction of neoliberal consumerism and entrepreneurialism.
Re-Hegemonization of Diaosi's Contradictory Consciousness
This contradictory consciousness could be developed into a more critical consciousness and/or be re-hegemonized by dominant forces to provide new hope.
As the Diaosi identity becomes more popular, celebrities -especially youth icon bloggers and technology entrepreneurs -begin to appropriate this identity (Gu 2014 ). In addition, it seems that Diaosi identity is partly being mainstreamed and rehegemonized in two ways. In the same period, this civilizing mission was echoed by Feng Xiaogang, who is a commercially-successful film director/writer/actor. He claimed that he had difficulties in explaining Diaosi to his counterparts abroad. In his microblog, he recorded that this identity is not so much self-deprecating as 'self-destructive' and even 'brainless' (Chinanews.com 2013) . This piece was forwarded tens of thousands of time. This has attracted agreement from Hao, the linguist, but this disruption generated resentments from within the Diaosi community (Sina.com 2013) . Nonetheless, language and identity monitors of this kind continue to scrutinize and even sanitize the term by morphing it from its original version of Diaosi (meaning 'fans of penis') to a homonym of 'Dil-si' (meaning 'hanging wire'). Major websites such as Wikipedia (in Chinese) and Baidu even posed these two terms as being interchangeable with some even claiming that 'Dil-si' is more suitable for 'female Diaosi'. This focus on the sanitization of its scatological aspects (Yang, Tang and Wang 2014: 11) This marginality is rejected by some subalterns and accepted by others. Some indulge in consumption and/or seek pleasure from the culture industries; others live in hope and assume personal responsibility to fulfill these entrepreneurialconsumerist dreams by improving 'suzhi', obtaining better qualifications, finding good jobs, meeting good marriage partners, and moving over-ground to more comfortable housing. These entrepreneurial self-hopes coexist with experiences of social inequalities, suffering bodies, self-mocking irony, frustrated sexuality, and hopeless future as part of their system of signification. This system is by no means consistent or coherent. It contains 'contradictory consciousness' and fragmentation (Crehan 2002: 191-193) . The resulting political struggle is embedded in the contradictory ensemble of state-mediated capitalist-consumerist social relations that produce hope, devalued life, marginality and exploitation in China's cultural political economy.
Such contradictory locations are reflected in a common sense that contains hegemonic forms of thinking as well as modes of critical insight. It interlaces agreement with the dominant consumerist/entrepreneurial ideology and precariousness, loneliness, self-mockery, frustrations and latent critical thinking as part of the subaltern conditions and languages.
Two Sets of Concluding Remarks
This article ends with two sets of remarks. First, regarding the Diaosi, it examines the dialectical intertwining of a loser/little hope subject with the global imagination of China as a 'hope' object since the financial crisis. This is the conjuncture in which the Diaosi subject emerged. Their marginality is co-governed by global capitalist production, the land-and property-based mode of accumulation, and continuous state domination via a hukou-suzhi biopolitical population management policy mechanism. With increasing inequalities and the making of a devalued life, younger second generation workers self-narrate as Diaosi and express such identity affectively. They embody their marginality via a body discourse that builds on the everyday unevenness regarding power networks, consumption, marriage, love and intimacy. This self-representational struggle of Diaosi is fragmented and they remain at best a 'class against the dominant order' rather than becoming, as a primarily To give Gramsci a voice, this article suggests three (re-)entry points. First, examine the production of class consciousness not as automatic but as a culturally-mediated lived experience with diverse expressions (Zene 2011) . The latter shifts attention from the working class (proletariat or sub-proletariat) to 'subaltern classes/groups' that encompass more components of society (Buttigieg 2013: 36) . This allows an examination of different types of subaltern groups beyond their labouring identity we seek to go beyond first-generation subaltern studies and return to the Gramscian tradition, we should also focus on language/imaginations/discourses (not only communication practices), contradictory consciousness of the subaltern as well as the concurrent processes of re-hegemonization that involve diverse realignments of subaltern knowledge/practices with hegemonic principles (Vahabzadeh 2008: 108) .
In short, a neo-Gramscian entrypoint extends the examination of working-class consciousness to different types of subaltern classes/groups. The marginal and fragmentary elements of these groups have not become a class for itself; but exist as 'multiplicity' of elements of 'consciousness construction' (Modonesi 2014: 2; Green and Ives 2010: 292) . In this regard, movement beyond first-generation subaltern studies discloses a range of subaltern experiences of subordination and insubordination and the affective languages and imaginations that contains critical and contradictory insights that can be re-grounded diversely in hegemonic principles.
These constitute parts of the 'passive revolution' that depoliticizes and disrupts critical insights and alternative thinking among subaltern groups (Thomas 2009: 147 
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